Why is a proposed US-Saudi nuclear pact causing alarm in Washington and the Middle East?

The Trump administration backs a nuclear energy pact with Riyadh allowing Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium and process spent atomic fuel, two sources have said, a move that may worry regional states concerned about weapons proliferation. 

Here are some of the main issues at play:

WHAT HAS HAPPENED SO FAR?

Washington and Riyadh have for years been discussing a nuclear cooperation deal that would give Saudi Arabia access to U.S. technology and American companies a chance to win big contracts for Saudi atomic energy facilities. 

As always with nuclear technology, worries about security, weapons proliferation and political complications in a tinderbox region have been central concerns. 

Like all signatories to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Saudi Arabia has already committed to not developing an atomic bomb and consented to international inspections. But Washington has traditionally sought extra protections.

Two sources told Reuters this week that the Trump administration was now ready to submit an agreement to Congress. 

However, the sources said the pact does not include the "gold standard" barring Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium and processing spent atomic fuel — both possible pathways to making material for a warhead — or an "additional protocol" of extra international oversight. 

Those omissions are likely to worry U.S. Middle East allies, including Israel, and raise questions of consistency, as one of the justifications for the U.S. war on Iran this year was its refusal to give up an enrichment programme. 

There may also be opposition in Congress, where members have previously demanded tight guardrails on any deal. 

WHY DOES SAUDI ARABIA WANT A NUCLEAR PROGRAMME?

As the world's largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia may not seem an obvious candidate for nuclear power, but it aims to reduce carbon emissions and free up crude for export under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's Vision 2030 economic plan.

The U.S. Energy Information Administration said in 2024 that 68% of Saudi electricity was generated by burning gas and 32% by burning oil, with 1.4 million barrels a day of crude being used for power generation during the peak month of June. 

Atomic power could displace some of that, including for energy-intensive water desalination and air conditioning, allowing the kingdom to make more money from oil sales. 

However, Saudi Arabia has also said that if old foe Iran develops a nuclear weapon it would have to follow suit - a declaration apparently aimed at ramping up pressure on Tehran, but which has also fuelled concern about its own ambitions.

Many nuclear-power-producing countries do not enrich uranium domestically, relying instead on imported enriched uranium fuel for use in their reactors.

But in January 2025 Saudi Arabia said it would enrich uranium - a process that can also be used as part of a military programme - to create 'yellowcake' fuel for nuclear power generation that it could sell. 

WHAT'S IN IT FOR THE UNITED STATES?

There could be strategic and commercial gains.

Civil nuclear cooperation was an important inducement along with security guarantees in an effort by Trump's predecessor Joe Biden to broker a deal for Saudi Arabia and Israel to normalize relations.

However, those two issues are now uncoupled, Reuters has reported, though a nuclear deal could be a sweetener in U.S. diplomatic efforts with the kingdom. Riyadh has ruled out normalizing ties with Israel without Palestinian statehood.

U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright met Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman last year and said the two countries were on "a pathway" to a civil nuclear agreement. He made no mention of a wider deal over other issues such as normalisation.

A deal would put U.S. industry in a prime spot to win contracts to build Saudi nuclear power plants as well as providing insight into the kingdom's atomic programme that could alleviate any U.S. worries over weapons proliferation. 

Under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the U.S. may negotiate agreements to engage in significant civil nuclear cooperation with other nations.

It specifies nine nonproliferation criteria those states must meet to keep them from using the technology to develop nuclear arms or transfer sensitive materials to others.

U.S. law stipulates congressional review of such pacts.

SAUDI ARABIA HAS OPTIONS

Should the U.S.-Saudi pact fail, even at this late stage, several countries with established nuclear industries have expressed interest or are seen as potential partners for Saudi Arabia's nuclear programme.

State-owned China National Nuclear Corp (CNNC) reportedly submitted a bid in 2023 to construct a nuclear plant. 

Russia's state nuclear firm Rosatom, which built a nuclear plant in Egypt, has also signed preliminary cooperation agreements with Riyadh. Other potential contenders include South Korea, which built reactors in the neighbouring United Arab Emirates, and France. 

The choice of partner will likely depend on technological offerings, financing, and geopolitical alignment, including conditions related to nuclear fuel handling.

URANIUM ENRICHMENT

A key issue is whether Washington might agree to build a uranium enrichment facility on Saudi territory, when it might do so, and whether Saudi personnel might have access to it or it would be run solely by U.S. staff in a "black box" arrangement.

Without rigorous safeguards built into an agreement, Saudi Arabia, which has uranium ore reserves on its territory, could theoretically use an enrichment facility to produce highly enriched uranium, which, if purified enough, can yield fissile material for bombs.

A source told Reuters the proposed U.S.-Saudi agreement provides a legal pathway for cooperation on the nuclear fuel cycle, which includes uranium enrichment, but does not oblige Washington to transfer any related technology or capabilities to the kingdom. 

There are diplomatic issues too: Washington's top regional ally Israel has repeatedly voiced opposition to the idea of a Saudi civil nuclear programme.