Taiwan analyst says China’s ascendancy In the Pacific aided by Iran War

The decision by the Trump administration to withdraw naval assets from the Pacific and send them to support the Iran War is the most recent sign of US withdrawal from the Pacific with profound national security implications for the United States, according to Peter Enav, Publisher Taiwan Strait Risk Report.

Enav, along with Ken Moriyasu, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. spoke to the Propeller Club of Northern California PCNC on April 29th.

Enav warned that the United States focus on the Iran War and the Middle East weakens important alliances in the Pacific: “Chinese leader Xi Jinping has long believed that the United States is a declining world power, and China itself is a rising one. While a final accounting of the geopolitical implications of the American-Israeli initiated Middle East war remains to be made, it seems likely that Xi is now feeling secure about the validity of his assessment.”

American Credibility in Asia has Taken a Huge Hit

Enav argued that “American credibility in Asia has taken a huge hit” and that “even before the beginning of the US war against Iran on February 28, longstanding American allies in the western Pacific were already asking difficult questions about the long-term viability of the post-World War II American security architecture in the region. By late April these questions had developed into a tsunami of doubt, largely because of the lightning speed with which American military assets were being transferred from Asia to the Middle East … Among the most negatively affected countries in this regard was South Korea, which was unceremoniously denuded of large parts of the American-built THAAD antimissile system it depends on to help deter potential North Korean aggression. Also badly affected were Japan and Australia, which much like South Korea itself, profit immensely from the regional presence of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group to keep them safe and secure. The bottom line here is that throughout the region once inconceivable questions about the reliability of the American security umbrella were being asked by national leaders, and the once equally inconceivable option of trying to make a deal with China was gaining new momentum. Japan is probably not going to be involved here – the bottomless pit of World War II generated bilateral enmity effectively rules it out – The same cannot be said for Seoul, not least because the considerable extent of its economic ties with Beijing points it in a strongly accommodationist direction.”

Taiwan’s Independence Looks Less Viable

Enav warned that the bottom line is that Taiwan’s independence looks less viable: “All of this of course has clearcut implications for the open-ended continuation of Taiwan’s de facto independence, largely because rising Chinese power both inside and outside the immediate Indo-Pacific region invariably works to the island’s detriment. A key event here will be the mid-May summit meeting in Beijing between President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, where it now appears likely that Xi will attempt to leverage his newfound international standing to wrest from Trump at least a conditional promise to limit future American weapons sales to Taipei and publicly declare official American opposition to de jure Taiwanese independence. To be sure, Trump will probably do his best to try to resist Xi’s demands, but even if he succeeds for a time, the respite will likely be only temporary, given the developing power realignment between the sides.”

Taiwan’s 2028 Presidential Election Could Be Key

Enav hypothesized that the 2028 presidential election in Taiwan could critical if the pro-China KMT opposition party came to power. This is also reflected in a Chinese News report entitled “The reunification roadmap: How Beijing plans to win Taiwan without war” that concluded: “Beijing’s messaging on Taiwan has evolved from rhetoric to roadmap. By adapting Hong Kong’s “patriots governing” model and testing US resolve, the 2028 Taiwan presidential election could become a defining moment for the future of the Taiwan Strait.”

To further bolster this possibility, Cheng Li-wun, the chairperson of Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), met in the much-anticipated summit between Cheng and Chinese President Xi Jinping in his capacity as the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) General Secretary: “For Beijing, Cheng’s visit is a key part of its latest experimentation with what could be called party-to-party diplomacy between the CCP and KMT, in place of government-to-government diplomacy between Beijing and Taipei,“ according to an Atlantic Council report.

China Bolsters Central Asia Supply Lines

The Hudson Institute’s Ken Moriyasu argued that China is working methodically to reduce its exposure to U.S.-controlled sea lanes and has shifted critical energy imports to overland pipelines from Central Asia and Russia: “ At the same time, it is accelerating a shift away from gasoline-powered vehicles to electric vehicles that run on electricity generated by coal and nuclear power – energy it can source domestically or from neighbors like Mongolia and Russia. These efforts are driven by economic and development priorities. But they also have clear strategic implications in a crisis, reducing China’s vulnerability to maritime disruption.”

Moriyasu noted that Beijing is relocating the arteries that matter most into continental space where American power is thinner and geography favors China: “China is not making a “pivot” inland and abandoning the seas. Maritime shipping will remain cheaper. It is a dual-track strategy: pipelines and rail for strategic goods such as energy, minerals, and food; maritime shipping for everything else.”

What this means is that If China succeeds in establishing a continental sanctuary, it shapes Beijing’s assessment of the risks it would face: “A China that feels strategically secure on land is more likely to accept risk at sea. Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, China’s Eurasian strategy has centered on linking neighboring states through railroads, pipelines, and trade corridors—what Beijing calls a “community of a shared future.” When China prospers, these neighbors prosper. This was the logic behind the Belt and Road Initiative. The Belt and Road Initiative is framed in economic terms – and for many participants it is primarily about development. But infrastructure shapes alignment: over time, connectivity creates dependencies that carry strategic consequences.”

As a result, “Maritime trade is cheap in peacetime but vulnerable in a crisis, which is why China is willing to pay a premium for routes it can control.”

Finally, Moriyasu argues that decisions about Taiwan “will depend on domestic politics, military readiness, and perceptions of U.S. resolve.”